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Factors influencing farmers’ participation in
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Private landholders’ contributions to biodiversity conservation are critical in
landscapes with insufficient formal conservation reserves, as is the case in Australia’s
tropical savannas. This study reports results from a discrete choice experiment
conducted with pastoralists and graziers across northern Australia. The experiment
was designed to explore the willingness of pastoralists and graziers to sign up to
voluntary biodiversity conservation contracts. Understanding preferences for con-
tractual attributes and preference heterogeneity were additional objectives. Such
knowledge can increase effectiveness and efficiency of conservation programs by
informing contract design, negotiation and administration. Random parameter logit
modelling showed that of contract attributes, conservation requirement, stewardship
payment, contract duration and flexibility in contract conditions significantly
influenced choices. Land productivity was a significant factor as were attitudes.
There was significant heterogeneity of preferences for all contract attributes. Models
were run for best–worst scaling responses and the first preferences subset, with the
latter model deemed superior. Latent class modelling distinguished four classes of
decision-makers and illustrated different decision heuristics. Conservation investment
strategies, which offer farmers contract options that meet biodiversity requirements
while accommodating heterogeneous attribute preferences, are likely to lead to
increased participation rates. Complementary suasion efforts are also required which
espouse the benefits that pastoralists derive from biodiversity and participation in
voluntary conservation contracts.
Key words: agri-environmental measures, stewardship payments, payments for
environmental services, discrete choice model, preference heterogeneity, attribute
attendance.
1. Introduction
The tropical savannas of Australia are a vast area of grass-dominated
landscapes that stretches across the north of the continent. The major land
use is extensive beef cattle grazing on very large farms, which typically
measure hundreds of square kilometres in size (Bortolussi et al., 2005).
Tropical savannas also support an abundance of endemic plants and animals.
The ecological condition and biodiversity value of Australia’s tropical
savannas has declined since European settlement due to a number of factors
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including grazing, changed fire regimes, and the introduction and spread of
exotic plant and animal species (Lewis 2002; Woinarski and Ash 2002;
Woinarski et al. 2007; Radford et al. 2014; Woinarski 2014). Tropical
savannas are currently under-represented in the formal conservation estate,
prompting calls for farmers – that is, pastoralists and graziers – to be actively
engaged in landscape-scale biodiversity conservation (Woinarski et al. 2007).
This coincides with increasing interest by the north Australian pastoral
industry to explore the provision of environmental services as one possible
enterprise and income diversification strategy (Puig et al. 2011).
To date, participation of north Australian pastoralists and graziers in
biodiversity conservation projects has been low (ABS 2011). This is likely due
to a combination of paucity of such projects in northern Australia and
ineffective targeting and design of past and existing projects (Hajkowicz
2009). Designing incentive programs that are both effective and efficient
requires an understanding of, firstly, the financial resources required to
incentivise a sufficient number of farmers to participate in on-farm conser-
vation and, secondly, the way in which program and contract design and
administrative features influence participation.
Choice experiments are a stated preference method and are ideally suited to
help the design of new agricultural markets. A potential emerging market in
northern Australia is for private biodiversity conservation services, whereby
farmers receive a recurring stewardship payment in return for undertaking
actions that support biodiversity. Policies and programs based on the notion
of payments for environmental services (PES) have existed in other countries
and parts of southern Australia for some time, but are a recent topic in a
northern Australia context (Greiner et al. 2009a). Choice experiments have
been used elsewhere to inform the design of agri-environmental and PES
programs (Ruto and Garrod 2009; Espinosa-Goded et al. 2010; Christensen
et al. 2011; Beharry-Borg et al. 2013; Broch et al. 2013; Kaczan et al. 2013).
Very few and only locality-specific choice experimental studies with pasto-
ralists and graziers have been conducted in northern Australia to date (Rolfe
and Windle 2005; Adams et al. 2014) and consequently no comprehensive
understanding exists of how the north Australian beef industry may engage
with such programs to assist landscape-scale biodiversity conservation efforts.
To fill this knowledge gap, a choice experiment was designed and
implemented (Greiner et al. 2014).
This study focuses on data analysis and presentation of results. In doing so,
the paper pursues a number of objectives. It contributes to the body of
empirical research using choice experiments to inform conservation policy. In
particular, the research results generate the knowledge foundation for the
design and tailoring of contractual biodiversity conservation to the distinct
landscape and farm operating conditions of Australia’s tropical savannas.
The paper achieves this by exploring farmers’ willingness to participate in
contractual on-farm biodiversity conservation, preferences for and trade-offs
between contract attributes, and the influence of socio-economic and
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psychological variables on stated participation. The paper also adds to the
methodological discourse on choice experiments by comparing model results
derived from the full best–worst scaling data set with results obtained from
the first preference subset. The combination of mixed multinomial choice
modelling and latent class modelling explores and explains the preference
heterogeneity encountered among pastoralists and graziers.
The method section of the paper summarises the rationale for and key
design features of the discrete choice experiment and choice modelling
techniques employed. It also provides an overview of the study area and
explains aspects of survey implementation. The results section provides
relevant descriptive survey results and shows and interprets the choice
experimental results. The paper concludes by discussing the results in the
context of the international literature and offering conclusions as to the policy
relevance of the findings.
2. Method
2.1. Design of the discrete choice experiment
Choice experiments are based on the presumption that participants evaluate
the alternatives presented to them in a choice task by choosing the alternative
(among those presented in the task), which gives the greatest relative utility
(Hensher et al. 2005). In the given research context, this means that a
responding pastoralist will choose conservation contract A over B, if U (XA,
Z) > U (XB, Z), where U represents his/her indirect utility function, XA the
attributes of alternativeA,XB the attributes of alternativeB, andZ the personal
(e.g. socio-demographic and attitudinal) and property characteristics (e.g. size,
land productivity, farm profitability, ownership structure) that influence the
pastoralist’s utility. Choice analysis requires the inclusion of a stochastic error
term e in the utility function to reflect the unobservable factors in the
respondent’s utility function. Thus, a pastoralist will choose alternative A over
B, if V (XA, Z) + eA > V (XB, Z) + eB, where V is themeasurable component of
utility estimated empirically, and eA and eB reflect the unobservable factors in
the pastoralist’s utility function of alternative A and B, respectively.
There are a range of design decisions to be made, in particular relating to
the expected make-up of the utility function, statistical properties of the
experimental design, likely model to be used for data analysis and number of
choice tasks, attributes and attribute levels defining an alternative, number of
alternatives defining a choice, and response mechanism (Hoyos 2010; Bliemer
and Rose 2011). All design decisions ultimately influence the results of choice
experiments and resulting recommendations. A good design is able to explain
more of the observed variance and minimises the stochastic element e. A
detailed deliberation of all choice design considerations and decisions relating
to the discrete choice experiment (DCE) for this study is given in Greiner
et al. (2014). Table 1 offers a summary of other key choice design elements.
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Table 1 Summary description of the choice experimental design
Design elements Expression Explanation
Conceptual
construct
Willingness to accept WTA provided construct validity as farmers
have property rights over their land and
contracts ask them to give up elements of
those rights in return for recurring
payments.
Response format Best-worst scaling Compared to ‘pick one’, best-worst scaling
delivers a full ranking of all alternatives
contained in the choice task. Ranking was
achieved through sequential identification
of ‘best’, ‘worst’ and ‘second best’
alternatives.
Number of
alternatives
Three alternatives
plus ‘none’ option
Three contract alternatives were offered plus
a ‘none’ option to ensure conceptual
validity of choice task given that
participation in contractual biodiversity
conservation was voluntary.
Labelling of
alternatives
Unlabelled Generic contract options were offered to
focus respondents’ attention on trading
off contract attributes.
Types and number
of attributes
Five Attributes were developed in consultation
with the pastoral industry and confirmed
through pilot testing and pretesting.
Attributes defined the hypothetical
conservation contracts in terms of the
conservation requirement and its impact
on cattle production, conservation
payment, contract length, flexibility and
monitoring arrangements. Attribute details
are shown in Table 2.
Number of choice
tasks per respondent
Six The final design included 24 choice tasks,
which were blocked into four versions of
six choice tasks each. Each survey
contained one block, that is each
respondent
answered six choice tasks. Blocks were
assigned randomly. In the pretest,
respondents answered two blocks each.
Statistical properties Bayesian D-efficient Compared to orthogonal designs, efficient
designs lead to smaller standard errors in
model estimation at smaller sample sizes.
Modified Federov algorithm was used,
which does not force attribute-level balance.
D-error criterion was used to optimise
efficiency of the experimental design. The
design was updated following pretest of the
survey with priors derived from pretest
choice data. The Bayesian D-error for the
final design was 0.0716. Design was
optimised for choice data analysis with
RPL.
 2015 The Authors.
4 R. Greiner
Here, only the matters of response mechanism and model to be used for data
analysis are revisited in detail as they bear direct relevance to the results.
The response format was multiprofile ‘best–worst scaling’ (Marley and
Flynn 2012). The more commonly used ‘pick one’ format only reveals the first
preference among the alternatives while best–worst scaling is designed to
deliver a full ranking of all alternatives contained in a choice set. By offering
choice data in addition to the first preference, best–worst scaling offers a
means of data augmentation and is particularly useful in situations where the
sample size is expected to be low – as was the case here – or in situations
where the number of choice tasks needs to be minimised (Potoglou et al.
2011; Lancsar et al. 2013). Best–worst scaling has also been found to be
superior when dealing with qualitative data such as the different conservation
requirements and different monitoring arrangements (Flynn et al. 2007).
Attributes and attribute levels were determined in a multistage process
involving literature review, expert and industry consultation, and pilot
testing. The final experiment is summarised in Table 2. The definition of
conservation requirements was guided by (i) the idea of a multitenure reserve
systems (Fitzsimons and Wescott 2008), which would see land taken out of
cattle production and managed, by the pastoralist, exclusively for biodiversity
conservation, and (ii) co-existence of grazing and biodiversity, based on the
premise that conservation of many species of animals and plants is
compatible with grazing, provided grazing land management respects the
needs of these species (Woinarski and Ash 2002). Payment levels were guided
by historical data about the land productivity of the tropical savannas, in
particular the value of cattle sales per hectare during 1992–2011 as derived
from farm survey data (ABARES, 2012) and industry comment.
The experiment adopted a Bayesian D-efficient design (Sandor and Wedel
2001; Bliemer et al. 2009; Bliemer and Rose 2013). Priors were estimated
from results of a pretest of the DCE. The design was optimised for random
parameter logit (RPL) modelling of choice data. A final panel design was
generated with 24 choice tasks being blocked into four versions of six choice
tasks (Greiner et al., 2014). Each choice task consisted of three contract
alternatives and a ‘none’ option to mimic the voluntary nature of conser-
vation contracts. Respondents were asked to pick their preferred option (‘1st
preference’) and subsequently indicate the least preferred then second
preferred option in any given choice task. This best–worst scaling format
allowed for all contract alternatives and ‘none’ to be ranked. Figure 1
provides an example of one discrete choice task.
Prior to choice data analysis, protest respondents needed to be identified
and removed from the analysis (e.g. Windle and Rolfe 2014). Protest
respondents are respondents who had not engaged with the choice experi-
ment, meaning their stated zero WTA was unlikely to be a reflection of their
true WTA. A follow-up question was asked of those respondents who
answered ‘none’ as their preferred alternative in all choice tasks to explore the
underlying reason. If the reason was insufficient monetary incentive offered
 2015 The Authors.
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Table 2 Contract attributes, attribute levels and explanation
Attributes Levels Definition and other relevant details
Conservation
requirement
3 levels:
Short spelling
Long spelling
Total exclusion
The conservation requirement expresses the
environmental service to be remunerated.
Focus is on broad-scale biodiversity
conservation by removing cattle from the
contract area either completely for the
duration of the contract period or
temporarily (i.e. ‘spelling’ the contract area
every year) during times when biodiversity is
particularly sensitive to grazing. Defined
relative to cattle grazing and associated
opportunity cost.
SHORT SPELLING: Exclusion of cattle for
short periods each year depending on
biodiversity need, for example during nesting
season of brolga (Grus rubicunda). There is
no reduction in cattle production associated
with short spelling. Short spelling is the base
level for this contract attribute.
LONG SPELLING: Prolonged spelling of
contract area each year, for example
wetlands or riparian areas are spelled during
entire dry season, or grassland supporting
Gouldian Finches (Erythrura gouldiae)
is spelled during wet season and until after
grasses have seeded. This may result in up to
50% reduction in cattle production from the
contract land.
TOTAL EXCLUSION: All cattle are
removed from the contract area (‘locking
up country’), resulting in zero cattle
production from that land. Fences need to
be maintained. Weed and feral animal
control need to be conducted. Stray cattle
must be removed from contract area every
year. A burning regime may have to be
implemented to achieve desired biodiversity
outcomes.
Annual
conservation
payment
6 levels:
$1, $2, $4, $8, $16, $32;
[$ per ha and year];
The contract stipulates and annual per-hectare
conservation payment. The value shown is
for year 2013 and the payment is indexed
for the duration of the contract period,
that is adjusted for inflation.
The payment does not cover fixed costs:
necessary infrastructure is paid for separately
and upfront.
Note: To enhance respondents’ ability to
assess the conservation payment in the
context of their cattle enterprise, their
business situation was established and an
indicative value of per-hectare income from
cattle production derived. Respondents were
also prompted to consider the cost
implications of each of the conservation
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by any of the alternatives on offer, the respondent was retained in the choice
data; if it was disagreement with the conceptual context of the valuation
scenario, the respondent was removed from the choice data.
2.2. Survey of north Australian pastoralists and graziers
The objective of the research was to inform landscape-scale biodiversity
conservation in Australia’s tropical savannas by eliciting information from
pastoralists and graziers. It was thus paramount to capture a geographically
diverse and sufficiently large sample of properties in the empirical investi-
gation. The research area (Figure 2) included approximately one million sq
km of tropical savannas (TS-CRC 2014), intersecting with the ‘north live
cattle export region’ (Gleeson et al. 2012). The north live cattle industry is
based on bos indicus type cattle, which are suitable for tropical conditions
and resistant to ticks. Cattle graze on native pastures of low nutrient value,
which typically carry between 2 and 10 head of cattle per sq km (PWC 2011).
Table 2 (Continued)
Attributes Levels Definition and other relevant details
requirements – for example, cost savings
associated with running a smaller herd or
additional costs of feral animal control
action – and risk dimensions – for example,
accumulated biomass exacerbating fire risk
and therefore requiring controlled burning.
Contract length 4 levels:
5, 10, 20, 40 years
No perpetual arrangement or covenants
(when conservation requirements are
registered on the land title) are considered.
If property is sold, the contract transfers to
new owner unless he/she chooses to
discontinue.
Flexibility 2 levels: Flexibility
No flexibility
No flexibility: Standard contract with fixed
contract conditions. Penalties may apply if
conditions are violated. Base level.
Flexibility: Farmer has the right to negotiate
a 1-year suspension of the contract in
‘exceptional circumstances’ and, if suspension
is granted, graze the contract area during
specified exclusion periods without incurring
a penalty. Maximum frequency 1 in 5 years.
No conservation payment received during
that year.
Monitoring
(conducted by)
2 levels:
External
Self
External monitoring: The administrating
agency undertakes regular monitoring or
contracts an independent provider for the
task. Base level.
Self: The pastoralist undertakes the
monitoring but random spot-checks are
conducted to validate results of
self-monitoring. Each year the reports of
25% of program participants are validated.
 2015 The Authors.
Farmers’ preferences for conservation contracts 7
The key market of cattle from this region is live export, predominantly to
south-east Asia.
The number of potential research participants was estimated to be <700
(Western Australia  35, Northern Territory  110, Queensland  550) due
to the generally large size of stations and consolidation of stations into larger
pastoral enterprises. A recent survey of pastoral properties in the Northern
Block B                   
Choice Situation 2 Option A Option B Option C None
Conservation requirements
Cattle exclusion for 
proLONGed periods; up 
to 50% loss of cattle 
production
TOTAL exclusion of 
cattle   +   active 
management for 
biodiversity outcomes
TOTAL exclusion of 
cattle   +   active 
management for 
biodiversity outcomes
Annual payment ($/ha) $ 8/ha $ 32/ha $ 16/ha
Contract length (years) 10 years 40 years 5 years
Flexibility of conditions Flexibility No flexibility No flexibility
Monitoring conducted by Self     (25%  random 
spot-checks)
Self     (25%  random 
spot-checks)
External
Q1: Which option would you 
choose?
Q2: Which is your least 
preferred option?
□ □ □ □
Q3: Which is your 2nd 
preferred option?
□ □ □ □
0
Figure 1 Illustration of a discrete choice task.
Figure 2 Overview of research area.
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Territory reported an average property size of approximately three thousand
sq km across the Katherine and Barkly regions (DPIF 2010), which are also
covered in this survey. To maximise opportunities for pastoralists to
participate in the research and thereby maximise response rate and minimise
participation bias of the sample (Wagner 2012), different response formats
were offered to accommodate respondents’ preferences and to capture
decision-makers within business units.1 A survey containing the choice
experiment was conducted during April to July 2013, and 104 valid surveys
were completed.
Principally, the survey was administered face-to-face during visits by the
lead researcher on pastoral properties or the company’s head office. Visits
were pre-arranged by telephone and all pastoralists and graziers who were
prepared to participate in the survey and were available at a time matching the
travel itinerary were interviewed.2 In addition, research meetings with groups
of pastoralists were conducted in association with industry and community
events. Facilitation of meetings ensured integrity of the quantitative data in
terms of independence of responses. In three instances, respondents completed
the survey in their own time and provided the response by mail.
Responses captured approximately 15 per cent of the estimated sample
frame with good coverage achieved in all three states/territories and a variety
of property sizes and situations represented in the sample (Table 3). Total
area coverage was approximately 250,000 km2, or about one quarter of the
research area.
2.3. Choice data analysis
Prior to choice data analysis, four protest respondents (3.8 per cent, all from
Queensland) were identified. As each survey contained multiple choice tasks
(Greiner et al. 2014), panel specification of the choice models was necessary.
Panels were unbalanced because some respondents did not complete all six
choice tasks and respondents who participated in the pretest and completed
12 choice tasks were included in the full sample. The design of survey and
choice data sets are published (Greiner 2014). Data analysis was conducted in
NLOGIT 5 software (Econometric Software Inc 2012).
The increasing use of random parameter logit (RPL) and latent class (LC)
models for the analysis of choice experiments in farming contexts has been
underpinned by a recognition of the heterogeneity in farm conditions and
farmer preferences, and the desire to make this heterogeneity relevant for
1 For corporation-owned properties, head office was initially contacted regarding partic-
ipation in the survey. The CEO or GM decided who was best to complete the survey. In some
instances, station managers were subsequently interviewed. In other instances, a relevant
person at head office would complete the survey for either the entire property or
agglomeration, or part thereof.
2 The lead researcher drove in excess of 25,000 km to visit pastoralists and conduct research
meetings.
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policy formulation (e.g. Jaeck and Lifran 2014; Schulz et al. 2014). RPL
modelling was adopted as the principal data analytical method to establish
the influence of contractual attributes on stated willingness to participate in
contractual biodiversity conservation, trade-offs between them, and prefer-
ence heterogeneity. RPL is a mixed multinomial logit model, which relaxes
key assumptions constraining the interpretation of a multinomial logit
(MNL) model, namely (i) IID – that is, that unobserved effects are ‘extreme
value 1’ distributed, independent and identically distributed, (ii) indepen-
dence of observed choices and (iii) homogeneity of preferences (Hensher et al.
Table 3 Overview statistics of survey respondents
Variable (unit) Measure/Category label Value
Property size (km2) Mean 2411
Median 775
Minimum 18
Maximum 16,116
Sample total 250,750
Herd size (head) Mean 15,925
Median 7000
Minimum 50
Maximum 110,000
Sample total 1,656,200
Stocking rate (head/km2) Mean 8.9
Median 8.1
Standard deviation 4.9
Minimum 0.8
Maximum 22.8
Profit of the beef enterprise in
2011/12 (% of respondents)
Large profit 7%
Small profit 36%
Broke even 21%
Small loss 17%
Large loss 20%
Respondent’s role on the
property (% of respondents)
Owner-Manager 62.1%
Employed manager 26.2%
Other 11.7%
Gender of primary respondent
(% of respondents)
Male 81.6%
Age of primary respondent
(% of respondents)
<30 years 5.8%
30–39 years 24.3%
40–49 years 26.2%
50–59 years 25.2%
60+ years 18.5%
Business structure (% of respondents) Family-owned 80.8%
Corporation-owned 19.2%
Length of current property
ownership (% of respondents)
<5 years 8.7%
5–9 years 11.7%
10–19 years 26.2%
20–39 years 29.1%
40+ years 24.3%
Membership of industry/NRM
organisation(s) (% of respondents)
Yes 76.7%
Previous participation in a conservation
program (% of respondents)
Yes 32.7%
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2005). RPL models take into account heterogeneity of the parameter values
among respondents (Train 2000; Hensher et al. 2005; Marsh 2012; Mariel
et al. 2013). Simulations are required in RPL models to provide parameter
approximations. Parameters were estimated using 1000 Halton draws. In
addition to the attributes, a number of covariates were included in both
models as nonrandom parameters. Those found to be not significantly
associated with choices in both models were deleted from the final models
while significant covariates were retained. Table 4 details the variables
contained in the final, parsimonious models.
To further explore heterogeneity of preferences among respondents, LC
models were also estimated. LC models assign respondents into behavioural
groups or latent classes, thus accounting for taste differences or different
types of decision heuristics (Beck et al. 2011). Preferences are assumed to be
homogenous within each latent class but differ between classes (Colombo
et al. 2009). There is no common acceptance of the best criteria for
determining the correct number of classes (Nylund et al. 2007) and
parsimony and interpretability are key. Determining the final number of
classes was therefore an iterative process, combining quantitative measures of
model fit and meaning in a given context (Beck et al. 2011).
Table 4 Model Variables
Variables Details
Attributes
TOTAL EXCLUSION Dummy coded 1 = Total exclusion of cattle is required to care
for biodiversity
LONG SPELLING Dummy coded 1 = Cattle have to be removed from the land for
long spelling periods every year, which may result in a loss of up
to 50% of cattle production from that area
PAY Conservation payment [$ per ha and year, base year 2013,
indexed for contract period]
YEARS Contract period [years]
FLEXIBILITY Right to negotiate with funder to suspend contract in ‘exceptional
circumstances’: 1 = yes, 0 = no
MONITORING Who conducts the monitoring: 1 = self (i.e. grazier but with
25% spot-checks every year), 0 = external
ASC Alternative specific constant = 1 for status quo alternative
Covariates
LANDPROD Land productivity; measured as 3-year average stocking rate
[head of cattle per km2, average across the enterprise] (Table 3).
BIO-ATT Attitude towards biodiversity; measured in terms of agreement
with statement ‘Biodiversity is important to me personally’
[5-point response scale: 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly
agree]
PES-ATT Attitude towards financial incentives to encourage on-farm
conservation; Measured as perceived effectiveness of ‘financial
incentive schemes such as the one explored in this research to
help you undertake (more) conservation activities on your
operation’ [5-point response scale: 1 = not effective at all to
5 = extremely effective]
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RPL and LC models were run on the fully ranked choice data provided by
the ‘best–worst’ scaling design. The same models were also run of a subset of
the data which contained only the first preference choice made in each choice
task. This is referred to as the ‘1st preference’ data set, which mimics a ‘pick
one’ choice design. Casewise deletion was used for missing covariate values,
meaning that respondents for whom covariate values were not available were
eliminated from the analysis. This resulted in 1643 and 598 observations
being available in the fully ranked ‘best–worst’ choice data and ‘1st
preference’ subset, respectively.
3. Results
3.1. RPL model results
The results for the RPL models for both best–worst data (i.e. full preference
specification) and 1st preference data are summarised in Table 5. Both
models delivered a good statistical fit as indicated by values of pseudo R2 of
Table 5 RPL model results for 1ST preference and best-worst data
Best–worst model 1st preference model
Coefficients SE Coefficients SE
Random parameter means
TOTAL EXCLUSION 1.102*** 0.251 2.866*** 0.553
LONG SPELLING 0.110 0.144 0.833** 0.342
PAY 0.114*** 0.016 0.254*** 0.034
YEARS 0.045*** 0.005 0.110*** 0.017
FLEXIBILITY 0.826*** 0.150 1.483*** 0.308
MONITORING 0.237** 0.100 0.324 0.221
Random parameter standard deviations
TOTAL EXCLUSION 1.164*** 0.279 1.781*** 0.490
LONG SPELLING 0.941*** 0.132 1.726*** 0.336
PAY 0.108*** 0.015 0.161*** 0.030
YEARS 0.031*** 0.006 0.074*** 0.013
FLEXIBILITY 0.996*** 0.262 1.518*** 0.358
MONITORING 0.356 0.264 0.908** 0.365
Nonrandom parameters
LANDPROD 0.043*** 0.014 0.129*** 0.041
BIO-ATT 0.637*** 0.147 0.636** 0.286
PES-ATT 0.351*** 0.088 0.575*** .1904
ASC 4.051*** 0.712 3.800** 1.492
Model statistics
Observations 1643 – 598 –
Log likelihood 1521 – 565 –
AIC/N 1.873 – 1.943 –
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.332 – 0.319 –
Chi-squared 1514 – 528 –
Note: ***, **, *significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. See Table 4 for definition of variables.
ASC, alternative specific constant; SE, Standard error.
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0.33 and 0.32, respectively. At a general level, considering coefficient direction
and significance, the two models yielded very similar results. The ASC was
positive and significant for both models meaning that there were preferences
towards the ‘none’ option, which could not be explained by the variables
contained in the model.
Direction of attribute influence was consistent with economic theory.
Higher conservation payments (‘PAY’) significantly increased likelihood of
participation in conservation contracts. Longer contract terms (‘YEARS’)
significantly reduced the likelihood of participation. The need for TOTAL
EXCLUSION of cattle had a significant negative impact on likely participation,
with the coefficient much larger compared to a requirement for a LONG
SPELLING period each year. Both conservation levels were defined in terms of
opportunity costs relative to short spelling of the contract area each year,
which would not affect the cattle production from the contracted land
(Table 2). The 1st preference model indicated a significant disutility of LONG
SPELLING while the disutility in the best–worst model was not significant. The
inclusion of flexibility provisions into contracts, that is the right to negotiate
contract suspension in exceptional circumstances, influenced stated uptake of
conservation contracts significantly and favourably. External monitoring
arrangements were found to be favoured by respondents over self-monitor-
ing, but only the best–worst model found MONITOR to significantly influence
preferences. From an interpretation perspective, the 1st preference model
provided a better fit with the narrative that the lead researcher found
emerging from the interviews, namely that opportunity costs from changes to
grazing regimes mattered most for the 1st preference choice while monitoring
arrangements played a minor role in 1st preference choices but were often
considered in the subsequent choices of each choice task.
The lesser importance of monitoring compared to other attributes was also
evident from stated attribute attendance. After completing the choice tasks,
respondents were asked to quantify their attribute attendance: ‘When making
your choice decisions, how strongly did you consider each of the attributes?’ The
rating scale was 1 = never to 5 = always. Attribute attendance for MONITOR
had a mean value of 3.07, with 15 per cent of respondents stating that they
‘never’ considered it and 23 per cent considering it only ‘sometimes’. Mean
attribute attendance of other attributes was as follows: CONSERVATION
REQUIREMENT 4.54, PAY 4.37, YEARS 4.49, and FLEXIBILITY 4.18.
Of covariates defining the pastoral business, land productivity (‘LANDPROD’)
was found to negatively and significantly influence participation probability,
meaning that pastoralists grazing less productive land were significantly more
likely to participate. Of covariates capturing social–psychological dimensions,
respondents’ intrinsic interest in biodiversity (‘BIO-ATT’) and favourable
opinion of the concept of payments for environmental services as a policy
mechanism (‘PES-ATT’) influenced participation positively and significantly.
Covariates that were tested but not included in the parsimonious model
because they were not statistically significant included respondent age,
 2015 The Authors.
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respondent education, property size, property ownership (corporate or family
owned), previous participation in conservation programs and enterprise
profitability.
The WTA estimates for the choice attributes were calculated as the negative
of the ratio of each attribute coefficient to the price coefficient. Confidence
intervals were estimated using the Krinsky and Robb (1986) procedure based
on the unconditional parameter estimates and applying 1000 simulations to
calculate the confidence intervals in this procedure. The results of the 1st
preference model (Table 6) show that ceteris paribus, to get respondents to
accept conservation requirements involving total exclusion of cattle from the
contract area required an annual payment of approximately $11 per hectare
per year while requiring them to spell land for long periods every year during
times when biodiversity was sensitive to cattle grazing required a lower
conservation payment of around $3.50 per hectare per year. Introducing
flexibility provisions into the contract reduced the payment that pastoralists
required by almost $6 per hectare per year. The inverse of this ‘discount’ in
exchange for some level of contractual flexibility can be interpreted as a risk
premium that respondents applied to contracts that they thought might limit
the scope for farm-level responses to environmental variability.
3.2. Latent class model
A four-class latent class model supports the existence of preference
heterogeneity for contract attributes and illustrates both the different
Table 6 WTA estimates and confidence intervals for the RPL 1st preference model
Attribute Summary description Mean
WTA
($/ha)
95% confidence
interval ($/ha)
TOTAL EXCLUSION Implementing a conservation strategy
that requires cattle to be excluded from
contract area for the duration of the
contract
11.08 (7.45–14.47)
LONG SPELLING Implementing a conservation strategy
whereby the contract area is spelled
every year for an extended period of
time resulting in up to 50% loss of
cattle production from that area
3.45 (0.71–5.95)
YEARS Adding 1 year to the contract duration 0.41 (0.31–0.53)
FLEXIBILITY Introducing into contracts the possibility
that a grazier can negotiate to suspend
the contract in ‘exceptional
circumstances’, but no more than 1-in-
5 years
5.90 (8.54 to 3.47)
MONITORING Moving from an external monitoring
system to monitoring being undertaken
by the grazier (with occasional spot-
checks)
1.17 (0.52 to 3.02)
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heuristics that respondents applied in the decision to participate in contrac-
tual biodiversity conservation and the diverse preference structures among
respondents (Table 7). Common between all four classes was a significant
positive influence of PAY at P < 0.001, indicating the central role of the level
of stewardship payment in respondents’ utility function and decision-making.
Class 1, with a membership probability of approximately 32 per cent, had
distinct preferences across all other contract attributes, which were very
similar to the whole-of-sample for total exclusion, long spelling and
flexibility, but had a higher time preference (average WTA for an additional
contract year was $1.24/ha/year) and also derived a significant disutility from
self-monitoring (WTA $4.85/ha/year). In contrast, class 4, with a membership
probability of 33 per cent, did not distinguish between the different
conservation requirements but focussed on the stewardship payment and
contract duration. Probability of membership in classes 2 and 3 was <20 per
cent each. Class 2 had a positive preference for long spelling arrangements
(compared to short spelling), a strong dislike of total exclusion (equivalent to
WTA $20.63/ha/year) but was insensitive to contract length. Class 3
associated a significant and high disutility with total exclusion and long
spelling, and with longer contracts (mean marginal WTA of $0.30/ha/year).
Model testing found no relationship between covariates and class member-
ship probability, indicating that class probability was not related to socio-
demographic or attitudinal factors.
4. Discussion
The research presented in this paper is based on a sample of 104 north
Australian graziers and pastoralists. While the sample may appear small in
absolute terms, it is large in relative terms as respondents collectively manage
approximately 250,000 square kilometres of land, or approximately one
quarter of the study area. The sample also succeeds in capturing the
heterogeneity of business and socio-demographic conditions of pastoral
enterprises across the tropical savannas. The sample size is sufficiently large
to estimate all attribute coefficients at the level of P < 0.01 statistical
significance because of the D-efficient choice experimental design, which
requires a much smaller sample size than a random orthogonal design (Rose
and Bliemer 2013). A systematic review of discrete choice experiments based
on design features and sample size by Bliemer and Rose (2011) supports the
assertion. Limitations associated with small sample size arise, however,
because the number of covariates that can be investigated in any given model
is constrained because of loss of observations caused by casewise deletion of
missing covariate values. This limitation was accepted in preference of
imputation of missing values.
RPL models were developed for the best–worst scaling data (i.e. full
preference specification) as well as the subset of 1st preference data. The
models yielded similar but not identical results and different WTA estimates
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for a number of attributes. Differences in estimates between the two
elicitation methods have been reported in the literature before (Louviere
and Islam 2008). In this case, there was virtually no difference for YEARS, but
difference for some qualitative variables was up to 73 per cent although the
direction of impact remained the same. The likely reason is inconsistency in
the attribute trade-offs respondents made between the three choices required
in each best–worst scaling task (Giergiczny et al. 2013). This assertion is
corroborated by the lead researcher’s observation that respondents found it
increasingly hard to perform successive choices required by each choice task
(Figure 1). Consequently, the 1st preference data was deemed to produce
more compelling models for an industry-wide analysis, which is the focus of
this paper. The augmented choice data, based on full best–worst specification,
may prove valuable for more in-depth analytical applications.
The model results about attribute preferences are consistent with expec-
tations based on the literature on farmers’ stated participation in environ-
mental services programs elsewhere. Pastoralists and graziers require a
greater monetary incentive to sign up to longer contract periods or
alternatives causing higher opportunity costs, and they prefer flexibility
(Windle and Rolfe 2005; Ruto and Garrod 2009; Espinosa-Goded et al. 2010;
Christensen et al. 2011; Peterson et al. 2011; Yu and Belcher 2011; Broch and
Vedel 2012; Jaeck and Lifran 2014).
Interestingly, the research does not find any statistically significant
influence on the decision to participate in contractual biodiversity conserva-
tion contracts based on property size, whether properties are family-operated
or corporation-owned, age and education level of pastoralists, and previous
experience with conservation programs. This means that likely participation
cannot be predicted on the basis of socio-demographic or business descrip-
tors. The principal factors explaining participation choice across the northern
pastoral industry are the contract attributes and foremost among them the
conservation requirement and level of stewardship payment offered. How-
ever, it is important to note that pastoralists have heterogeneous preferences
for contract attributes, as demonstrated by the RPL model results and
illustrated by the latent class model results.
Across the industry, participation is distinctly positively influenced by
favourable attitudes towards biodiversity and towards PES. This finding
highlights the importance of complementing new PES-style programs with
education and extension. Attitudes can be changed by explaining how PES
work and illustrating the social co-benefits that voluntary conservation
contracts can deliver to farmers (Greiner and Stanley 2013).
Introducing some level of contract flexibility significantly and positively
influences contract adoption. Flexibility –defined in this context as possibly
being able to give cattle access in exceptional circumstances to a grass
resource that may have been built up through contractual biodiversity
conservation – greatly reduces the premium that pastoralists seek for signing
up to contractual biodiversity conservation. This finding needs to be seen in
 2015 The Authors.
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the context of the highly risky business environment that north Australian
pastoralists operate in (Greiner et al. 2009b).
5. Conclusions
The research generates insights that can help enhance the emerging dialogue
between the pastoral industry and potential investors in biodiversity
conservation, including government, nongovernment conservation organisa-
tions and private businesses that wish to off-set their biodiversity impacts or
appear conservation-minded.
This research establishes that the pastoral industry operating across
Australia’s tropical savannas would consider participating in contractual
biodiversity conservation if suitable contracts were available. The choice
experimental results support a narrative that decisions about participation in
contractual biodiversity conservation are to a large extent driven by the
financial merit offered by the contract options relative to costs–including
opportunity and transaction costs, and costs associated with conservation
action. These considerations are independent of property size, type of
business ownership and operator age, but with clear consideration to risk
aspects including contract duration and contractual flexibility.
Due to the very large size of enterprises, competitive allocation of contracts
through mechanisms such as conservation tenders has limited applicability in
the tropical savannas. Targeting pastoralists for participation in contractual
biodiversity conservation needs to be based on identification of biodiversity
assets. To maximise likelihood of participation of targeted pastoralists, a
suite of contract options need to be offered. Contract conditions need to
ensure that the requirements of target biodiversity are met while attribute
options need to consider business-specific cost structures and the significant
heterogeneity in preferences across the pastoral industry. Including some
flexibility in contracts gives pastoralists more scope in responding to
environmental variability and risk, and will increase program participation
and reduce the conservation payments. Offering attribute choice, for example
for monitoring arrangements, appeals to different personal preferences and
thus also fosters participation.
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